We find that presidential and congressional influences affect the rate of disaster declaration and the allocation of FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) disaster expenditures across states. States politically important to the president have a higher rate of disaster declaration by the president, and disaster expenditures are higher in states having congressional representation on FEMA oversight committees.
A central contribution of public choice theory to the analysis of government activity is in viewing the activities of government, not as determined by some single altruistic dictator, but rather as the result of a process involving individual political agents who react to the incentives they face. This somewhat skeptical view of government provided by the public choice approach can be hard for many people to accept, particularly those who believe that in many important cases such as regulation, income redistribution, tax collection, and general government spending for the "public good" that the government acts to maximize public welfare; and that individuals in political power will put aside their personal self-interests in favor of the public good. In these cases then, where people would imagine the government acting benevolently, it is most important to test the predictions of the public choice model.
Tests of the public choice model to various cases of government activity have their basis in
what has been called the congressional dominance model, which postulates that bureaus are very responsive to the wishes of congress. As discussed by Moe (1987 Moe ( , 1997 , Weingast and Moran (1983) , and Weingast (1984) , the model suggests that congressional committees having both budget and oversight responsibilities see that bureaucrats implement the policy preferences of the legislators (legislators are wealth maximizers); and that the executive branch behaves as an electoral vote maximizer. There have been several empirical tests of various forms of the congressional dominance model. Wright (1974) , Anderson and Tollison (1991) , and Couch and Shughart (1997) find that New Deal spending across states was correlated with congressional power and the importance of a state's electoral votes in the next presidential election. In a study of Federal Reserve policy, Grier (1987) finds that Fed policy is influenced by changes in the leadership of the Senate Banking Committee. Faith, Leavens, and Tollison (1982) show that Federal Trade Commission (FTC) case rulings tend to be more favorable for firms with headquarters in a district having representation on FTC congressional oversight committees.
Finally, Young, Reksulak, and Shughart (2001) present strong evidence that Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audit rates are substantially lower in states that are politically important in the next presidential election, and are also substantially lower in the congressional districts of members on key congressional committees overseeing the IRS.
Here we examine whether congressional and presidential influences affect the rate of disaster declaration and the allocation of federal disaster relief payments made by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) .
2 This paper has several distinct advantages over earlier works on congressional dominance, afforded by the unique nature of disaster declaration and relief. The potential exists for political influence to impact the process at two distinct stages;
whether or not a disaster is declared, and then how much money is allocated for the disaster.
After a disaster strikes a particular area, the governor makes a request to the president for disaster assistance. After receiving a governor's request, the president then decides whether or not to declare the state or region a disaster area. Only after a disaster has been declared by the president can disaster relief be given. FEMA is in charge of determining the level of relief funding for the area, but further appropriations are determined by Congress in cases requiring large amounts of funding beyond FEMA's allocated budget.
FEMA was created by an executive order of President Carter in 1979 that essentially merged together many separate disaster relief agencies that had already been in existence. FEMA is responsible for allocating federal money to areas that have been adversely impacted by natural disasters such as hurricanes, earthquakes, tornadoes, fires, and severe flooding. However, a great deal of FEMA funding is also allocated for more minor weather phenomenon such as 
Sources of Political Influence
The process for FEMA disaster relief suggests there are two potential sources by which political influence may enter into the FEMA disaster relief process, both of which we test empirically. The first avenue of political influence is in the process of disaster declaration.
Disaster declaration is solely in the hands of the president. The Stafford Act also provides the president no concrete set of criteria on which to declare a disaster. Given that disaster declaration is a decision left entirely to the president, and because there is such a wide range of possible weather phenomenon for which disasters may be declared, it is possible that he may be more likely to declare a disaster in a state that is politically important. Also, because the Stafford Act allows the president to unilaterally declare a disaster without the approval of congress, it is possible that the president may use this power to punish or reward legislators who support or oppose his policies, or just simply tarnish the image of opposing party legislators in hopes of reducing their probability of reelection.
The potential for presidential political manipulation is in part due to the wording of the showing that presidential flood declarations are greater in election years where the president is running for reelection. Willet (1989) and Tabellini and Alesina (1990) 
whether states having greater representation on FEMA oversight committees receive higher FEMA disaster payments.
A Model of Presidential Disaster Declaration
The number of presidential disaster declarations by state by year was provided by FEMA.
Over the period 1991 through 1999, the number of presidential disaster declarations ranged from 98 in Texas to one in Wyoming. Florida and California had 23 and 16 disasters declared, respectively. Most states had between one and 20 disasters declared over the sample period. To explore the determinants of presidential disaster declaration, one could, using ordinary least squares (OLS), regress the number of presidential disasters declared in state i in year t on a vector explanatory variables, including state electoral importance and the governor dummy variable. However, the count nature of the dependent variable will render OLS inconsistent, as well as introduce heteroscedasticity into the model. The number of disasters declared, like the disaster expenditure variable, is censored. Also, the non-zero observations take values of y it = 1, 2, 3, etc., depending upon the number of disasters the president declared. To consider the countnature of the dependent variable we estimate the disaster declaration model using a Poisson regression model. The basic Poisson model (see Greene, 2000) is:
where λ it is the average number of occurrences (in this case disasters declared) within the given space and time interval (state and year). It is commonly assumed that λ it takes the form:
Given the nonlinear nature of the model, maximum likelihood is the favored estimation approach. The likelihood function for (1) can be written, using (2), as:
Estimating (3) will provide coefficient estimates, and finding ME[y it | x]/ Mx provides the marginal effects. These measure the impact of each explanatory variable on the mean rate of occurrence for disaster declaration.
We anticipate the electoral importance variable to be positive, suggesting that the rate of disaster declaration is higher in those states that are politically important to the president. If the president rewards governors of the same political party, then the governor variable should be positive. If disaster declaration is used as a tool by the president to politically help legislators of the same political party (or harm legislators of the opposing political party), a positive relationship is expected between the congress variable and the rate of disaster declaration. We also include per capita income to explore whether relatively wealthier states receive more or less favorable treatment by the president, along with a set of regional and year dummy variables to control for unobserved state and time effects. The coefficient estimates for the 1992 and 1996 year dummy variables are reported to reveal any differences in the mean rate of presidential disaster declaration during an election year (1991 is the omitted category). 10 In an attempt to control for the actual number of disasters in the state that year, we also include the number of disasters declared by private insurance companies as an independent variable in the regressions. Although we generate both estimates, we are primarily interested in the tobit coefficients.
We generate two oversight subcommittee variables to test whether states having greater representation on Stafford Act and non-Stafford Act oversight subcommittees receive higher FEMA disaster payments. One variable represents the total number of legislators from state i in year t that serve on one or more of four the Stafford Act oversight subcommittees (shown in Table 2 ). The other variable represents the total number of legislators from state i in year t that serve on one or more of the five non-Stafford Act FEMA oversight subcommittees. For any state within a given year, subcommittee membership by state ranges from zero to seven for all of the Stafford Act oversight committees, and ranges from zero to ten for all of the non-Stafford Act subcommittees. Membership by state also varies year to year in terms of the number of legislators on each subcommittee from each state. Although we expect both subcommittee variables to be positive and significant, we also expect the Stafford Act oversight subcommittee variable to be larger than the non-Stafford Act oversight subcommittee variable since the Stafford Act directly involves disaster relief, the primary function of FEMA.
We then separated the Stafford Act and non-Stafford Act variables to explore any differences between Senate and House subcommittees. Senators and representatives face different median voters. Also, given that disasters are normally isolated to a small geographic area, one might expect House members from the impacted district to be more responsive to the disaster (and thus exert more influence) than a Senator from the same state. This is because for most natural disasters, a House member will have a higher percentage of his or her constituency impacted by the disaster than a Senator from the same state. The benefit FEMA can provide a legislator on an oversight committee in terms of increased votes or support is thus higher for Representatives than it is for Senators. In this environment, Goff and Grier (1993) Other variables in the disaster expenditure model include private insurance property claims from natural disasters and Red Cross financial disaster assistance. These variables control for the size of the disaster and are expected to be positive. As in the disaster declaration model, we also include regional and year dummy variables with the 1992 and 1996 dummy variables reported to reveal differences in the mean level of disaster expenditures during an election year. Finally, the number of FEMA disasters declared is included in the models because the number of disasters declared is a determinant of the probability that the expenditure variable is non-zero.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Presidential Disaster Declaration
The results from three different Poisson regressions are shown in Table 3 . 12 The first specification only includes the number of private insurance disaster declarations and state economic variables. The second specification includes the congress variable and the governor dummy variable, and the third specification includes the electoral importance variable. All specifications contain regional and year dummy variables.
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As expected, the private insurance disaster declaration variable is positive and significant in all three specifications. Per capita income is significant in the third specification only, providing slight evidence that states having higher per capita income have a lower rate of disaster declaration than lower income states, possibly suggesting lower income states are favored over higher-income states.
We find evidence that certain political incentives facing the president significantly impact the rate of disaster declaration. Those state having a higher electoral importance have a higher rate of presidential disaster declaration. This finding is consistent with Downton and Pielke's (2002) finding that a greater number of floods are declared by the president in election years. We also find evidence that the mean rate of presidential disaster declaration was higher during election years compared to a non-election year (1991). The mean rate of disaster declaration during an election year was higher for Bill Clinton than George H. Bush. The coefficients on the 1996 election year dummy variable are greater in magnitude than all other year dummy variables, suggesting that the mean rate of disaster declaration in our sample was highest in the year of Bill Clinton's reelection campaign. We find no evidence that those states having a governor of the same political party as the president have, on average, a higher rate of disaster declaration. The insignificant coefficient on the congress variable suggests that disaster declaration in a state is not influenced by the political party of the state's legislators, suggesting that the president does not punish legislators of the opposing political party.
Several results from our disaster declaration regressions support the public choice model that political agents respond to the incentives they face. Evidence clearly shows that the rate of disaster declaration across states is not only a function of disaster occurrence, but is determinant on the political benefits that a state can offer to the president. In the next section we explore whether political incentives impact the distribution of FEMA disaster expenditures, given that a disaster has been declared by the president.
FEMA Payments and Congressional Influence
An important issue that arises regarding the estimation of the disaster expenditure models is the possible endogeneity of the subcommittee variables, thus resulting in possible biased coefficient estimates. The question is, are legislators from states having relatively more disasters more likely to be on a FEMA oversight committee than legislators from less disaster-prone states? Weingast and Marshall (1988) provide evidence that, at least to some degree, legislators will attempt to self-select to those oversight committees that are relevant to their constituents'
interests. To test for the endogeneity of the committee variables within a tobit framework, we follow the procedure outlined in Smith and Blundell (1986) . The procedure involves regressing the committee variables on the explanatory variables in Table 4 (and other identifying variables), keeping the residuals from these regressions, and including the residuals in the final tobit model. 14 A Wald test (distributed as χ 2 ) is then conducted on the null hypothesis that the residual slopes are jointly equal to zero (no endogeneity). We computed a Wald statistic for the two models containing subcommittee variables. The Wald statistic for the endogeneity test of the two subcommittee variables shown in model (2) 16 The coefficient estimates from the three tobit regressions are shown in Table 4 . 17 All three specifications reveal that private insurance disaster payments and Red Cross disaster assistance are directly related to FEMA disaster expenditures, as expected.
We find strong evidence that political incentives are significant determinants of FEMA disaster relief payments. The Stafford Act oversight subcommittee variable in model (2) The tobit coefficients in Table 4 measure the impact of each subcommittee variable on FEMA disaster payments given that a disaster has been declared. The marginal effects of each variable show the impact each variable has on the expected level of FEMA disaster payments, considering both the impact on the probability of disaster declaration and the level of expenditures once a disaster has been declared. The marginal effects from the three regressions in Table 4 are shown in Table 5 . The marginal effects also provide significant evidence of congressional influence over the level of FEMA disaster payments, with the results directly supporting those shown in Table 4 .
FEMA Payments -How Much Is Due to Political Influence?
Although we have shown that congressional oversight impacts the level of FEMA disaster relief in a state, it is interesting to calculate how much of total FEMA disaster relief over our sample period is motivated politically rather than by disaster severity or frequency. The predicted values (for non-zero observations only) from the regressions shown in Table 4 are the predicted level of total FEMA disaster expenditures given that a disaster has been declared. The level of FEMA disaster payments that are a result of congressional oversight can be computed by multiplying the significant coefficient estimates from each oversight subcommittee variable by the actual number of legislators on each type of subcommittee (Stafford or non-Stafford), and then summing over each significant subcommittee variable. The ratio of this value to the total level of FEMA expenditures gives the percent of total FEMA payments that are due to political influence. This calculation for model (3) suggests that 44.5% of total FEMA disaster payments are due to
Representative membership on FEMA oversight committees. Based on our data, sample period and estimated coefficients, this simulation suggests that nearly half of all FEMA disaster relief is explained by political influence rather than actual need.
V. SUMMARY & CONCLUSION
In this paper we examined how congressional and presidential influence impacts FEMA disaster expenditures across the states. Using state level FEMA disaster expenditure data from 1991 through 1999, we explore whether those states that are politically important to the president receive higher FEMA disaster expenditures than other states. We also explore whether FEMA disaster expenditures are higher in those states having congressional representation on FEMA oversight subcommittees.
The process of disaster declaration and funding lends itself well to empirical testing. After a disaster strikes a particular area, the governor makes a request to the president for disaster assistance. After receiving a governor's request, the president then decides whether or not to declare the state or region a disaster area. If a disaster has been declared by the president, congress and FEMA then decide upon the appropriate funding amount. In addition, under the Stafford Act the President has the authority to declare a disaster without the approval of congress. This fact offers an unique opportunity to explore how the president uses this power.
We find evidence that those states politically important to the president have higher rates of disaster declaration. Also, the mean level of disaster declaration is found to be higher in certain election years compared to non-election years. We find no evidence that the president uses his disaster declaration power to politically harm legislators of the opposing political party (or help legislators of his own party), or that states having a governor who is from the same political party as the president receive higher levels of disaster relief. We find strong evidence that once a disaster is declared, disaster expenditures are higher in those states having congressional representation on FEMA oversight subcommittees. Our estimates suggest that for each House member on an oversight subcommittee (which directly oversees disaster expenditures), states receive an average of $31 million in excess disaster expenditures for each Representative on a committee. Of all FEMA disaster relief provided over the sample period, our models suggest that nearly half of this total is due to political influences rather than by need.
Although FEMA is often promoted as a savior for individuals and communities hit by a disaster, we find evidence that disaster declaration and the level of FEMA disaster expenditures are both politically motivated. These findings cast doubt on FEMA's altruistic goal of financial assistance to those most in need, and questions the role of government versus private agencies in providing disaster relief.
1. Testimony to the United States Senate, April 30, 1996.
2. May (1985) and Platt (1999) further discuss the politics and process of federal disaster relief. 6. Source: America Votes, various years.
7. The formula we used is Y = 1 -4· (X -0.5) 2 , where X is the percent of presidential elections between 1956 and 1996 won by a Democrat and Y is the weighting factor having a maximum value of one at X = 50% and a minimum value of zero at X = 0% or X = 100%. Y is multiplied by the number of electoral votes in a state to arrive at the measure of electoral importance. Because Y has an inverted U-shape, the value of Y is the same if we used the percent of presidential elections that were won by a Republican. 14. Additional variables must be included in the first stage regression for identification purposes.
The other variables we included in the committee regressions were per capita income, population, the number of households, and the number of farm acres.
15. The fact that we find committee assignments to be exogenous yet we claim disaster relief is politically desirable may seem like a contradiction. The important fact here, however, is that the subcommittees that oversee FEMA are also responsible for overseeing other functions of government that would much more heavily drive the desire to be on the committees. In addition, because natural disasters are random and uncertain, it seems legislators would not actively seek to be on disaster oversight committees for the sole purpose of manipulating disaster aid because the opportunities to take advantage of this assignment are not clear and foreseen in advance.
However, once a disaster does occur in a committee member's state, FEMA is in a position to gain from increasing expenditures above their 'normal' levels. 17. We also included economic and demographic variables in the tobit regressions, such as per capita income, population, per capita transfer payments, farm and non-farm income, and retirement payments. Each of these variables were found to be highly correlated with the private insurance and red cross variables and were insignificant in each regression specification. Notes: Dependent variable is the number of presidential disasters declared in state i in year t. Absolute t-statistics in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The restricted log likelihood for the models (all $'s = 0) is -648.84. The coefficient on per capita income is interpreted per a $10,000 change. All coefficients are interpreted as their impact on the mean rate of disaster declaration. 1991 is the omitted year dummy variable. The sample period is 1991 to 1999. 
